P2P New Regulatory Measures To Maintain Financial Order

Internet banking is a natural mixed operation. Relying on the "one line, three sessions" separation supervision mode, such as the central bank, the Banking Regulatory Commission, the Securities Regulatory Commission and the CIRC, there is basically no way to get rid of the regulatory gaps and inefficient supervision.

Corelle

In December 28th, the provisional regulation on the management of business activities of intermediary organizations of online lending information (Draft for consultation) was officially announced by the CBRC.

Since the P2P industry began to become popular in 2014, the financial regulatory authorities in the past only made extensive requests, and finally put forward regulatory measures in the form of regulations.

Many people ask, if the P2P supervision method has been published for six months, can it prevent any major cases that shook the whole industry in the past period? I personally think that the answer is not clear enough, because the current "measures" still exist under the separate supervision system similar to the "double track system" regulatory thinking.

Internet banking is a natural mixed operation. Relying on the "one line, three sessions" separation supervision mode, such as the central bank, the Banking Regulatory Commission, the Securities Regulatory Commission and the CIRC, there is basically no way to get rid of the regulatory gaps and inefficient supervision.

At present, this approach, which is led by the CBRC, is still hard to establish a "big supervision" system beyond the one line and three meetings pattern.

Taking local exchanges as an example, financial risks have also been exposed before, but they are not in essence financial institutions under the jurisdiction of P2P or the banking regulatory authority.

Purely from the local level, financial institutions in many places give some support to all kinds of exchanges established locally.

Once this kind of local exchange broke out, the consequences will be far beyond the scope that the local finance office can handle.

Therefore, the incentive effect of the original regulatory structure is: a province can take more risks if it takes a bit more risk, but the final problem may be the national bill.

The new "Regulations" announced yesterday announced that the Internet

Intermediaries should be filed with the financial regulatory authorities.

From a positive point of view, decentralization of regulatory power can effectively solve the problem of "one size fits all".

But net lending institutions are naturally operating across the country through the Internet. How can we guarantee that there will be no adventure in the provinces that are eager to absorb the national financial resources?

For a larger number of Internet lending platforms, many promotional techniques are illegal.

The new measures clearly put forward a more detailed regulatory requirements, and can really plug loopholes and reduce the risk of hazards before some platforms have brewed huge disasters, but they can not fundamentally curb the P2P industry's breach of contract.

Finance in China has never been a single industry that can only consider itself. When P2P net loan is entangled with more complex factors such as the development of local economy and the savings of people's lives,

Decentralization to places may encounter difficulties and troubles that are hard to predict.

Current China

Two camps have emerged: one is the traditional financial industry under the "one line, three meetings" pattern. Every business can find a clear supervisor, and the other is the Internet Finance with mixed operation. Each product may span several regulatory sectors.

Such a "dual track system" can only be sustained under the premise of small scale Internet finance, and there is no way to support the greater development of the new industry.

From this point of view, Internet financial regulation must establish a "big supervision" pattern.

Rigid payment will accumulate risks and save small problems, but the risk of release depends on someone who really undertakes investment losses.

For the early P2P information matching platform pat lending, although it can use the decentralized investment to maintain the positive user income, it can not solve the problem of users complaining online that they have suffered financial losses.

Now the pat lending has changed from information matching to various disguised ways of protecting the principal and interest, which is the result of the Reverse Elimination in the competitive environment.

As long as we look at some reports on the default of the net loan platform, we can know that the distance between Chinese investor education and the "responsibility and risk" required by the method is far away.

Under such circumstances, it is hard to expect P2P net loan companies to take the risk of being eliminated by peers and let users bear the losses. It is not entirely realistic to expect some local financial regulatory departments to strictly enforce the law in order to break the risk of stability.